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ABSTRACT

Half a century ago George Stigler stated that evaluation of minimum wage policy should
revolve around two questions: Does such legislation diminish poverty? Are there efficient
alternatives? We argue that historically these were and continue to be appropriate questions to
ask with respect to this policy. We then replicate and evaluate the analysis in Chapter 9 of Myth
and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage with regards to these questions.
Given the evolution of the Earned Income Tax Credit we conclude that, aside from nostalgia, it is
hard to explain the continued support for increasing the minimum wage by those interested in
helping the working poor, and that Card and Krueger provide little new evidence to rekindle such
support.
Richard V. Burkhauser is Professor of Economics and Associate Director for Aging
Studies Program, Center for Policy Research, The Maxwell School, Syracuse University; Kenneth
A. Couch is an NIA Post-Doctorate Fellow, Center for Policy Research, The Maxwell School,
Syracuse University; and David Wittenburg is a doctoral candidate in the Department of
Economics, Syracuse University.
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PUTTING THE MINIMUM WAGE DEBATE IN A
HISTORICAL CONTEXT: CARD AND KRUEGER
MEET GEORGE STIGLER

The minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 have been
repealed by inflation. Many voices are now taking up the cry for a higher
minimum....Economists have not been very outspoken on this type of legislation.
It is my fundamental thesis that they can and should be outspoken, and singularly
agreed. The popular objective of minimum wage legislation—the elimination of
extreme poverty—is not seriously debatable. The important questions are rather
(1) Does such legislation diminish poverty? (2) Are there efficient alternatives?
The answers are, if I am not mistaken, unusually definite for questions of economic
policy. If this is so, these answers should be given. Some readers will probably
know my answers already (“no” and “yes,” respectively); it is distressing how often
one can guess the answer given to an economic question merely by knowing who
asks it. But my personal answers are [not as] important [as] the arguments on
which they rest (Stigler 1946, 358).

Economists have a poor track record in the replication and verification of important
findings in the literature. David Card and Alan B. Krueger, in their book Myth and Measurement:
The New Economics of Minimum Wage (1995, Princeton University Press), should be applauded
both for replicating past research on the minimum wage and advancing the economic literature on
a policy which has been central to those concerned about social justice in the United States over
the past century. Unfortunately, in their effort to introduce new methodologies into the debate
over the appropriateness of minimum wage policy, they neglect the political history of the debate.
As a result, they fundamentally alter the measures used to evaluate the redistributive success of
minimum wage increases. More importantly, they do not consider alternative public policies
which we argue make increases in the minimum wage an inferior policy for addressing the two
fundamental questions posed by Stigler half a century ago.

A Historical View of Minimum Wage Policy

The above quotation is from the first paragraph of Stigler’s seminal article, which was
published in 1946, the first year a Republican majority was elected in both the United States
House of Representatives and the Senate since 1930, and the same year a first-term Democratic
president committed to the preservation of New Deal policies was considered a sure bet to be
defeated in the next presidential election by a Republican challenger to those principles. At that
time, and for many people even today, no program provided a stronger litmus test of loyalty to
traditional New Deal principles than the minimum wage. Stigler’s arguments against it were
carefully chosen to criticize the minimum wage both on what are now familiar efficiency grounds
and more surprising, at least in 1946, on its ability to effectively reduce poverty.
Since 1946, critics of minimum wage increases have stressed their labor market
inefficiencies, and most of the empirical literature on minimum wage policy has concentrated on
the perceived negative employment effects of increases in the minimum wage. Card and Krueger
(1995) have done a major service to the field of labor economics by systematically reviewing the
employment effects literature and by using natural experiment techniques to empirically challenge
conventional wisdom that minimum wage increases reduce employment. While we find their
conclusion that minimum wage increases have led to employment increases unconvincing (see
Burkhauser, Couch, and Glenn 1995), we believe their work justifies a more skeptical evaluation
of past research on the minimum wage and provides a new direction for empirical analyses of the
labor market inefficiencies first outlined by Stigler. With respect to the second issue raised in the
Stigler article—how one should evaluate “who gets what” from an increase in the minimum
wage—we believe Card and Krueger (1995) offer much less useful direction.
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Card and Krueger (1995) discuss the topic of “who gets what” in Chapter 9. The chapter
begins with a quote from Stigler: “The manipulation of individual prices is neither an efficient nor
an equitable device for changing the distribution of personal income” (Stigler 1946, 362). The
authors juxtapose this quote with one from Edward M. Gramlich: “As long as minimum wages
are kept low relative to other wages, they are not terribly harmful and in fact have slightly
beneficial effects on low-wage workers and on the overall distribution of income” (Gramlich
1976, 450).
The implication one is likely to draw from this juxtaposition is that Stigler, and more
importantly the historical debate on minimum wage legislation, was concerned with the overall
distribution of income. Stigler, in fact, was making a much different point, as revealed by the
following passage drawn from the next paragraph:

One cannot expect a close relationship between the level of hourly wage rates and
the amount of family income. Yet family income and needs are the fundamental
factors in the problem of poverty (Stigler 1946, 362).

Further, Stigler argues:

The connection between hourly wages and the standard of living of a family is
remote and fuzzy. Unless the minimum wage varies with the amount of
employment, number of earners, non-wage income, family size, and many other
factors, it will be an inept device for combating poverty even for those who
succeed in retaining employment (Stigler 1946, 363).

Stigler urges abandonment of the minimum wage as a means of alleviating poverty and
replacement with programs more directly based on family size and composition. He states:
“There is great attractiveness in the proposal that we extend the personal income tax to the lowest
income brackets with negative rates in their brackets” (Stigler 1946, 365).1
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It is not an accident that Stigler emphasized the concept of poverty elimination in his
article rather than overall equality of income or labor earnings. He was influenced by nearly half a
century of debate surrounding the creation of a living wage which was intended by its proponents
to insure a minimum standard of living for workers and their families in the United States.
One of the earliest and most comprehensive proposals for a government-enforced
minimum wage was made in 1906 in the book A Living Wage by John A. Ryan, who argued that
“Whole classes of laborers, for example those employed in sweat shops, are underpaid, underfed
and undersupplied with everything which contributes to civilized life” (Ryan 1906, 18). This
important book, whose introduction was penned by the founder of the University of Wisconsin
economics department and the first president of the American Economic Association, Richard
Ely, helped popularize a living wage as a social goal. The concept of a living wage was based on
the ideas of a broad spectrum of social reformers of the day, from Pope Leo XIII, who argued in
Rerum Novarum (1891) that “There is a dictate of nature more imperious and more ancient than
any bargain between man and man, that the remuneration must be enough to support the wage
earner in reasonable and frugal comfort” [Ryan emphasizes](as quoted in Ryan 1906, 33), to
Sidney and Beatrice Webb, who in Industrial Democracy (1897) called for state-enforced national
minimum wages that would provide laborers “with the food, clothing and shelter physiologically
necessary, according to national habit and custom, to prevent bodily deterioration” (as quoted in
Ryan 1906, 82).
Proponents envisioned that the minimum wage would be “determined and secured through
a commission, empowered to adjust it to different industries and different centers of population”
(Ryan 1906, 315). They saw this type of governmental regulation as the best possible antidote to
“that perverse individualism which prefers irrational liberty and industrial anarchy to a legal
regime of order and justice” (Ryan 1906, 313). The minimum wage was only one of a set of
4

social goals articulated in Ryan’s book—which included the eight-hour day, the end of child labor,
and social security—that social reformers sought to obtain through direct government
intervention in the marketplace.2
The crusade for the establishment of a living wage through legislation spans the entire
twentieth century. Continued support for the minimum wage today is based in part on important
legal and political precedents its establishment created for further government intervention in the
marketplace in the name of social justice.
Resistance to the minimum wage first centered over its constitutionality. The nineteenth
century view that the right to contract was part of the liberty protected by the 14th Amendment to
the Constitution and that the right to purchase or sell labor could only be abrogated by legislatures
on very narrow grounds received perhaps its strongest judicial endorsement in Lochner v. New
York (198 U.S. 45, 1905). In that case the United States Supreme Court nullified by a five-tofour vote a New York State law establishing maximum hours of work. In his solitary minority
opinion, which first urged a “reasonable man” test on restrictions of liberty, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes stated:

A constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of a citizen to the state or of laissez-faire. It is
made for people of fundamentally different views, and the accident of our finding
certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to
conclude our judgement upon the question whether statutes embodying them
conflict with the Constitution of the United States....I think the word liberty in the
14th Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a
dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily
would admit the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they
have been understood by the tradition of our people and our law (Lochner v. New
York, p.76).

In 1908 a unanimous United States Supreme Court agreed in Muller v. State of Oregon
(208 U.S. 412) that state maximum hour legislation was constitutional, but only for women.3 In
5

1912, Massachusetts was the first state to establish a minimum wage law (unenforcable except by
publicizing the offending employer’s name) and by 1923, 14 other states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico had established such laws. In 1923, the United States Supreme Court,
in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (261 U.S. 525), ruled that the minimum wage law of the District
of Columbia was unconstitutional. In time, the view espoused by the dissenting justices, including
Holmes—that legislatures could regulate such contracts as long as the regulations were
reasonable—prevailed.
In 1937 in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (300 U.S. 379), the United States Supreme
Court upheld a state minimum wage law (Washington State) that applied only to women. In both
the District of Columbia and the State of Washington, commissions had been established to set
“standards of wages and conditions of labor for women and minors [which shall]...be reasonable
and not detrimental to health and morals, and which shall be sufficient for the decent maintenance
of women” (West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, p. 387). In that five-to-four decision, the United
States Supreme Court held that “The legislature was entitled to adopt measures to reduce the
evils of the <sweating system,’ the exploiting of workers at wages so low as to be insufficient to
meet the bare cost of living...” (West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, pp. 398-399). Thus, by 1938,
popular support for the minimum wage was based not only on its potential to provide a living
wage for the working poor but also on appellate court decisions which established that
legislatures could actively intervene in the marketplace to correct perceived social injustice.
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s impassioned speech calling on Congress to help the one-third of
Americans who were “ill-housed, ill-clad, and ill-nourished” (Roosevelt 1937) heralded the Fair
Labor Standard Act of 1938, and with it a national minimum wage for women and men. This
marked the culmination of a long struggle by social reformers to establish the constitutional right
of state legislatures to set a minimum wage, and to garner the political support to pass minimum
6

wage legislation at the national level. The debate then moved to who should be covered and at
what rate.
Significantly, the power to establish coverage and to increase the minimum wage was not
given to a commission of the type envisioned by social reformers like Ryan or like those
established by earlier state laws. Rather, coverage and the level of the minimum wage were to be
changed only by an act of Congress. World War II and its attendant inflation substantially
reduced the effective minimum wage, and social reformers called for Congress to increase it. It is
in the context of this social history that Stigler (1946) wrote.

The Minimum Wage and the Working Poor

Supporters of increases in the minimum wage over the last half century have been as
concerned with maintaining a living wage for workers as reformers in the first half of the
twentieth century. For example, Senator Edward Kennedy, in criticizing the meagerness of the
last increase in the minimum wage, declared that:

The minimum wage was, as it should be, a living wage, for working men and
women...who are attempting to provide for their families, feed and clothe their
children, heat their homes,[and] pay their mortgages. The cost-of-living inflation
adjustments since 1981 would put the minimum wage at $4.79 today, instead of
the $4.25 it will reach on April 1, 1991. That is a measure of how far we have
failed the test of fairness to the poor (Congressional Record, November 6, 1989,
S14707).

Similarly, President Clinton emphasized the importance of a living wage when he declared
in his 1995 State of the Union Address:

I’ve studied the arguments and the evidence for and against a minimum wage
increase. I believe that the weight of the evidence is that a modest increase does
not cost jobs, and may even lure people into the job market. But the most
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important thing is, you can’t make a living on $4.25 an hour (The White House,
1995).

These modern-day advocates of the minimum wage are repeating the historical
justification of a minimum wage on grounds of social justice and reflect the views of the majority
of its supporters. The belief of policymakers and the public that minimum wage legislation helps
the working poor explains their continued support. Their support, or the lack of it, has little to do
with predictions from the economics profession with respect to employment loss.4 In evaluating
the success of the minimum wage in the context of current social policy, the appropriate questions
for economists to ask are still those originally framed by Stigler (1946)—how does an increase in
the minimum wage affect the working poor, and are there efficient alternatives to it?
Elsewhere (Burkhauser and Finegan 1989, 1993; Burkhauser, Couch, and Glenn 1995),
we have used data from the U.S. Census for the years 1940 through 1980 and various years of the
Current Population Survey (CPS) to evaluate the link between the average hourly earnings of
workers (aged 17 to 64) in the lower half of the earnings distribution and the economic well-being
of their families as measured by an income-to-needs ratio (family income relative to the poverty
level for a family of their size).
In 1939, the first year of the minimum wage, the correlation between wages of workers
and their family’s income-to-needs ratio was 0.207. By 1989 it had dropped to about one-fourth
of that level—0.053. Family income, as Stigler (1946) pointed out, is dependent not only on the
wage rate, but also on the number of hours worked, work earnings of other family members, nonwage income, and family size. The growth of multi-worker families and the introduction of
government programs designed to provide lower income families with resources have dramatically
weakened the relationship between the wage rates of workers and family well-being. This weaker
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relationship has reduced the ability of new minimum wage increases to target additional income to
the working poor as evidenced by the most recent increase.
It is in this context that we replicate the table in Card and Krueger that is most relevant to
this question. Then we suggest an alternative method to help the working poor which we believe
better achieves the stated goal of minimum wage supporters for the last century—ensuring a
living wage for working Americans.

Replicating Card and Krueger’s Results in Chapter 9

Between 1989 and 1992, the minimum wage in the United States was increased from
$3.35 per hour to $4.25 per hour. In the first part of Chapter 9, Card and Krueger draw a sample
of wage and salary earners from the January-March 1990 CPS to illustrate how the workers likely
to be affected by this increase were distributed in the population. (Additional details of their
empirical estimations are contained in the Appendix.)
Rather than using the distribution of the population relative to the poverty line as their
yardstick of distributional impacts, Card and Krueger array their tables by income deciles. They
divide all individuals aged 16 and older, including workers and non-workers, into ten equally sized
groups on the basis of total family income. Why they choose to array individuals by total family
income as a measure of economic well-being is unclear, since their measure does not account for
family structure. Family size and composition are widely acknowledged to have a major impact
on the resources available to any individual member.5 They also exclude children from their
sample but include men and women past normal retirement age, again for unspecified reasons.
Furthermore, Card and Krueger do not recognize in their analysis that most people live in multipersons families. In measuring economic well-being, one must either use the family as the unit of
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analysis, adjusted for size, or treat all people as individuals but assign some component of total
family income to the individual.
To illustrate our concerns about the use of income deciles as a means of gauging the
distributional efficiency of the minimum wage, consider a man captured in the second decile of
Card and Krueger’s income distribution.6 His unadjusted family income would be between $8,000
and $13,560 in 1988. If he lived by himself or with another adult he would not be considered in
poverty even with an income of $8,000, and his income-to-needs ratio could be as high as 2.35.
Alternatively, if he lived in a family with three children, he would be in poverty across the whole
income bracket. Individual income cannot be accurately measured without accounting for family
size. These issues and others are discussed by Stigler (1946) and are well recognized points in the
literature on poverty measurement.7
Despite our reservations about their income measure, we replicate their findings using
their population definitions (Table 1). We find, as they did, that most poor people over the age of
16 live in the first three deciles of this population (column 1); the near-poor (persons living in
families with incomes between 100 and 150 percent of the poverty line) are found in the bottom
half of the deciles (column 2); and those in the top part of the decile are more likely to work
(column 3).
Card and Krueger begin their discussion of this table by showing how increases in the
minimum wage are likely to affect people across the income distribution. But in column four of
their table, the base is shifted from all persons in the decile to only those people in the decile who
are working. We replicate their column 4 in column 4b, and, like them, we show that 28.8
percent of the 28.3 percent of workers in the first decile earned between $3.35 and $4.25 per hour
in 1990. While this is certainly accurate, it dramatically shifts the “who gets what” question from
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how those who benefit from the minimum wage hike are distributed across people in the income
distribution to the share of workers in the income decile who benefit.
Our column 4a offers a bridge to Card and Krueger's columns 4 and 5. Column 4a shows
that when you continue to keep all people aged 16 and over as your base, the beneficiaries of an
increase in the minimum wage are more broadly spread out across that distribution. While the
largest percentage is in the first decile, the relative difference in eligibility for an increase in wages
across deciles is much less than implied by a casual look at column 4b. Hence in column 4a, 6.7
percent of all persons are eligible in the first decile while on average only 3.8 percent are eligible
in the overall population. In contrast, in column 4b, 28.8 percent of all workers in the first decile
are eligible relative to 7.1 percent of all workers. Column 5 replicates column 5 in Card and
Krueger. This column is roughly ten times the ratio of the value in any cell of column 4a divided
by 3.8, the percentage of all people aged 16 and over who are eligible to receive the minimum
wage increase.
While the original Card and Krueger table is not incorrect, their results in Column 4b
and 5 are at odds with the work of other scholars like Horrigan and Mincy (1993). This
difference is understandable, but it may be due to factors other than those discussed in their text
(p. 288). Horrigan and Mincy (1993, p.268, Table 8.6) are simply presenting the income
distribution of affected families relative to all families with at least one minimum wage worker.
Conceptually, this is a different measure than that used by Card and Krueger and no a priori
reason exists to believe the results should be consistent. Again, Card and Krueger consider the
distribution of income of the family of each worker as opposed to the distribution of incomes of
families that contain a worker. Interestingly, had Card and Krueger retained the entire population
of family incomes for those aged 16 and over as their basis of comparison, as we did in Table 1
column 4a, they would have arrived at much the same conclusion as Horrigan and Mincy, that
11

family incomes of the affected are distributed nearly uniformly within the overall distribution of
family incomes of individuals over age 16.8
It is at this point that Card and Krueger deviate even further from the historically
important question of distributional impacts as posed by Stigler (1946) to a set of questions
related to the impact of the minimum wage on the distribution of labor earnings. While these
questions are interesting in themselves, they are quite different from asking about the
consequences of the minimum wage on family income or poverty. More importantly, in their
discussion of the distribution of labor earnings, Card and Krueger fall prey to the very pitfall
Stigler warned of, that little can be inferred from wage rates or labor earnings about poverty.
Hence, the next section of Chapter 9, which measures the effect of the minimum wage on family
earnings (by comparing changes in the labor earnings distribution in different states rather than
simulating the effect of a minimum wage on family income, as is done in other studies), confuses
changes in the labor earnings distribution with changes in the income distribution, which were at
the heart of simulations by Gramlich (1976), Johnson and Browning (1983), Burkhauser and
Finegan (1989), Horrigan and Mincy (1993), and Burkhauser, Couch, and Glenn (1995).

An Alternative Measure of “Who Gets What”

Rather than continue with what we believe is a fundamentally flawed
yardstick—individually assigned total family income unadjusted by family size—we now propose
a yardstick more in keeping with the historical goal of minimum wage legislation, i.e., the wage
distribution of workers by the poverty status of their families. To make these measurements, we
use Card and Krueger’s sample of all workers aged 16 and over, but we array these workers by
the income-to-needs ratio of their families The income-to-needs ratio is the ratio of total family
income divided by the official poverty line for a given family. In 1994 the poverty line for a family
12

of four was $14,800. Therefore, a worker living in a family with four members and a total income
of $44,400 would have an income-to-needs ratio of 3.0.
In Table 2 we provide an alternative way of looking at who was helped by an increase in
the minimum wage from $3.35 to $4.25 per hour relative to others. The hourly wages of all
workers in the population aged 16 and over are shown across several income-to-needs categories.
We find that 7.1 percent of all workers earned wages between $3.35 and $4.25 per hour in 1990.
This number corresponds to the percentage of affected workers reported in our Table 1 and by
Card and Krueger in their Table 9.2. While a small percentage earned less than $3.35 (2.1
percent), the vast majority of workers earned more than the proposed minimum wage of $4.25
per hour (90.8 percent).
Tables 1 and 2 tell similar stories, but there are important differences between them. The
$3.35 to $4.25 column in Table 2 is approximately the same as Table 1, column 4b. It shows the
percentage of workers in each income-to-needs category who are affected by the increase in the
minimum wage. Workers who live in poor families are 3.6 times more likely to be helped by the
minimum wage hike than the average worker (25.8 divided by 7.1). But Table 2 also shows that,
as is the case with workers not living in poverty, the great majority of the working poor will not
be helped by a minimum wage hike to $4.25 since they already earn more than $4.25 per hour.
The reason workers earning more than $4.25 per hour lived in poor families was not
because they had a low wage rate. Rather, they either worked less than full-time or, even
working full-time, had a family that was too large to be lifted above poverty despite their higher
wage rate. (See Burkhauser, Couch, and Glenn 1995 for a more detailed discussion.)
While it is certainly true that poor workers are more likely to earn a minimum wage,
Table 2 also shows that the vast majority of minimum wage workers do not live in poor or even in
near-poor families. The reason is obvious—only 6.1 percent of all workers live in poor families
13

and only about 12.2 percent of all workers live in near-poor (income-to-needs ratio between 1.0
and 1.5) or poor families. About the same number of minimum-wage workers (32.8 percent) live
in families with incomes three times the poverty line as live in near-poor and poor families
combined (35.0 percent). For this reason, minimum wage increases are extremely ineffective as a
mechanism for reducing poverty.
Simply showing the distribution of affected workers overstates the share of benefits going
to the families of the working poor if, on average, the marginal gain going to a worker in a poor
family is lower than that going to a non-poor worker. This occurs either because the average
wage of poor workers is relatively closer to the new $4.25 per hour minimum than non-poor
workers or because the affected poor workers are working fewer hours. Further, the affected
working poor may be more likely to suffer reduced hours or the loss of a job if there are negative
employment consequences of a minimum wage hike.
These findings are consistent with Stigler’s view that there is only a fuzzy relationship
between a person’s wage rate and the economic well-being of the family in which the person lives.
Advocates of the minimum wage must recognize that such increases are not target-efficient and
are even less so than they were half a century ago. Moreover, the role of government and the
number of policy options available to reduce poverty have changed considerably since the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Today, the appropriate question to ask is what
alternatives to minimum wage hikes are available to help insure a living wage for the working
poor.

The EITC Versus the Minimum Wage

Although it might be argued that the focus of Card and Krueger’s book is single-minded,
the book is nonetheless silent on the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). There is not a single
14

reference to the EITC, a program which offers a clear alternative to raising the minimum wage as
a mechanism for tailoring a living wage for working Americans. In Table 3, we use the same CPS
data to compare the distributional effects of a simulated increase in the minimum wage to a
simulation of benefits resulting from legislative changes in the EITC program between 1989 and
1992. The counterfactual question we ask is what effect these programs would have if they had
been immediately adopted.
In 1989 the minimum wage was $3.35 per hour. The 1989 Amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) increased it to $4.25 by 1992. In the first two columns of Table 3, we
simulate the effect of increasing the minimum wage from $3.35 to $4.25, using the population of
workers identified by Card and Krueger as likely to be affected. In our simulation, we assume
there are no employment effects. Our results indicate that less than 20 percent of the total
benefits accrue to poor families and 34 percent to poor and non-poor families combined. In
comparison, 32 percent of the benefits go to families with income-to-needs ratios greater than 3.0
and 66 percent to families with an income more than 150 percent of the relevant poverty line.
In contrast, the EITC targets a minimum wage boost to low-wage workers who live in
low-income families with children. In 1989, an eligible minimum wage worker who lived in a
family with income below $7,520 actually received $3.82 for an hour’s work—$3.35 plus a 14
percent tax credit. Between 1989 and 1992, Congress increased the EITC marginal credit rates
from 14 to 17.6 (18.4) percent for eligible workers with one (two or more) child. Hence, even if
the 1989 FLSA amendments had not been adopted, EITC-eligible minimum wage workers would
still have seen their hourly wages grow to $3.94 for a family with one child and $3.97 for a family
where two or more children were present.
The maximum EITC in 1992 was $1,324 (17.6 percent of $7,520) for taxpayers with one
child and $1,384 (18.4 percent of $7,520) for taxpayers with more than one child. In 1992, the
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EITC began to be phased out at an earned or adjusted gross income of $11,840 at the rate of
12.57 cents per dollar for those with one child and 13.14 cents per dollar for those with two or
more children. All benefits were phased out at $22,370. (See Table 1A in the Appendix for a
more detailed description of EITC program parameters over this period.)
Columns 3-6 in Table 3 show how the gains from changes in the EITC between 1989 and
1992 would have been allocated across families with different income-to-need ratios in the
absence of the 1989 amendments to the FLSA. Consistent with our minimum wage simulations,
we assume that the EITC has no effect on employment. We also assume that all eligible families
receive the credit.
Column 5 shows that increases in EITC benefits would have cost taxpayers $4.04 billion.
Column 6 shows how those benefits were distributed across different income-to-needs categories.
Workers living at or near the poverty line received 59 percent of all dollars from the EITC, while
those living in families with an income-to-needs ratio greater than 3.0 received only 4.3 percent.
This contrasts sharply with the distribution of benefits from the 1989 minimum wage hike, in
which upper-income families with income-to-needs greater than 3.0 received 60 percent more
than poor families. EITC increases provided five times more benefits to workers in poor families
than to workers in higher income families.
A major advantage of an EITC approach to insuring a living wage to the working poor is
that it achieves, by means of a family size-adjusted credit and an income test, far greater target
effectiveness than simple across-the-board increases in the minimum wage. Table 3 shows how
critical this family income-based help is to the working poor. When we focus only on the
population of workers who are helped by a boost in the minimum wage, we see in column 4 that
41.3 percent of EITC benefits go to the working poor compared to 19.3 percent of the minimum
wage hike, a relative increase of more than 100 percent. This subpopulation of the working poor
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whose hourly wage rate was between $3.35 and $4.25, however, receives only one-quarter of the
total benefits going to the working poor (.25 billion of 1.02 billion). The rest go to poor families
with workers who have wage rates above $4.25 but who, because of low hours or a large family,
still live in poverty. Additional benefits go to those not covered by the minimum wage who earn
less than $3.35 per hour.
The EITC, by supplementing the market wage of workers whose income falls below a
prescribed level, can be thought of as a targeted minimum wage. In 1993, a bipartisan majority of
Congress passed a proposal of the Clinton Administration to increase the EITC. By 1996, these
changes will raise the effective minimum wage for those eligible for a two-child EITC credit from
$4.25 to $5.95 per hour.9 (For a fuller discussion of how increases in the 1993 EITC will be
distributed, see Burkhauser, Couch, and Glenn 1995).

The Future of Minimum Wage Legislation

Enactment of the minimum wage established a milestone in the institutional relationship
within which binding market contracts are made in the United States. We doubt if the majority of
those now opposed to further increases in the minimum wage are anxious to end the federal
government’s power to limit freedom of contract as it has been accepted over the last half
century, although some may. Likewise, we doubt if the majority of those in favor of increasing
the minimum wage would argue that Ryan's turn of the century picture of the American labor
market as dominated by a “perverse individualism which prefers irrational liberty and industrial
anarchy to a legal regime of order and justice” is still accurate and would seek additional industrial
policy set by government commission, although some might.
Rather, America over the last century, in contrast to many European countries, has
rejected the use of government-mandated “industrial partners” to establish wage-setting patterns
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in the economy. This vision of the labor market, which was much in the spirit of the turn-of-thecentury socialists who were among those advocating minimum wage laws as a mechanism to that
end, failed to take root in the United States. In fact, the minimum wage has increasingly become
an anachronism with respect to either redistributing income or protecting workers against poverty
in the United States. The federal income tax has, for the most part, been the principal tool of
redistribution in the United States. The negative income tax and more recently the EITC have
each been seen as alternative methods of targeting wage subsidies to the working poor. Aside
from nostalgia, it is hard to explain continued support for increasing the minimum wage by those
interested in helping the working poor. Card and Krueger, in fact, provide little new evidence to
rekindle such support.
Card and Krueger have produced an impressive body of work that challenges conventional
wisdom about the negative employment consequences of minimum wage increases. They have
demonstrated that natural experiments offer an important and useful method of evaluating the
consequences of minimum wage hikes. Further, they have provided results that call into question
the view that minimum wage hikes are associated with employment declines.
Nonetheless, their research is not clearly tied to historical perspectives concerning the
primary goal of minimum wage legislation, that is, the reduction of poverty.10 Since their research
lacks this historical perspective, changes in the income distribution are inappropriately equated
with changes in the labor earnings distribution. Furthermore, their use of income deciles
unadjusted for family size, as opposed to poverty-based measures of need, clouds rather than
clarifies the fundamental issue of interest. Finally, in considering the efficiency of a minimum
wage for transferring income, other alternatives such as the Earned Income Tax Credit are never
considered.
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Given our problems with the measures used by Card and Krueger to gauge the impact of
the minimum wage on the working poor, there is a statement in their book with which we
certainly agree but which might surprise traditional advocates of minimum wage increases.
As noted in the introduction of this chapter, the connection between the poverty
rate and the minimum wage rate is necessarily limited, because two-thirds of adults
who live in poverty do not work.11 Nonetheless, the minimum wage is sometimes
defined as an “antipoverty program,” and much of the related rhetoric from
supporters of the minimum wage focuses on its supposed antipoverty effects (Card
and Krueger 1995, 305).
One wonders what John Ryan, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Senator Kennedy, President
Clinton and the vast majority of political supporters of the minimum wage might think of that
statement. It is clear what George Stigler would think: he would mark down a “no” and a “yes”
for Card and Krueger.
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TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS AND NON-WORKERS AFFECTED BY
THE APRIL 1990 MINIMUM WAGE INCREASE BY
FAMILY INCOME DECILEa
(in percents)

Poor
(1)

Near-Poor
(2)

Work
(3)

Affected
(4a)

Affected Who
Work
(4b)

Distribution of Those
Affected Who Work
(5)

All

10.6

8.6

62.4

3.8

7.1

100.0

1

81.1

16.5

28.3

6.7

28.8

17.4

2

21.1

39.8

43.0

4.8

13.3

12.6

3

3.8

18.3

53.4

4.8

10.3

12.7

4

0.7

9.5

59.8

3.7

7.2

9.9

5

0.0

1.5

66.0

3.7

6.2

9.7

6

0.0

0.2

68.6

2.9

4.6

7.6

7

0.0

0.0

73.9

3.4

5.3

9.0

8

0.0

0.0

75.2

3.1

4.9

8.3

9

0.0

0.0

78.2

3.2

4.4

8.4

10

0.0

0.0

77.6

1.7

2.5

4.5

Decile

a

Columns 1, 2, 3, 4b, and 5 replicate Table 9.2 of Card and Krueger (1995). Family income deciles are
constructed so that 10 percent of all civilians aged 16 and older are in each decile. Poor individuals are those who
live in families with total family income below the appropriate 1989 poverty line. Near-poor individuals are those
who live in families with family incomes between 100 and 150 percent of the poverty line. Affected workers are
those whose hourly wage is between $3.35 and $4.25 per hour. Column 4a shows the distribution of affected
workers relative to the universe in columns 1-3. Column 4b shows the distribution of affected workers conditioned
on work status but employing the same income deciles.
Source: Outgoing rotation group of the March 1990 Current Population Survey.

TABLE 2
WAGE DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS BY THE INCOME-TO-NEEDS RATIO OF THEIR FAMILIESa

Income-toNeeds Ratiob

Total

Percent of
All Workers

Percent of
Affected
Workers

10.1

100.0

6.1

22.0

45.7

8.6

100.0

2.8

6.1

24.7

43.7

10.8

100.0

3.3

6.9

10.4

22.7

49.4

14.7

100.0

8.2

11.9

0.9

8.1

15.7

47.6

25.9

100.0

17.9

20.3

0.7

0.5

3.8

6.7

27.6

60.7

100.0

61.7

32.8

1.4

0.7

7.1

12.1

34.1

44.5

100.0

$0.01 to
$2.99

$3.00 to
$3.34

$3.35 to
$4.24

$4.25 to
$5.50

$5.51 to
$9.99

$10.00 and
Over

Less than 1.00

4.8

1.3

25.8

29.1

28.8

1.00 to 1.25

3.9

0.8

15.6

25.5

1.25 to 1.50

3.7

2.2

14.9

1.50 to 2.00

1.7

1.1

2.00 to 2.99

1.8

3.00 and Above
Percentage
a

Affected worker population is defined in exactly the same way as in Table 9.2 of Card and Krueger (1995) as individuals working at the time of the survey
whose wage rate ranged from $3.35 per hour to $4.25 per hour. More detail is provided in the Appendix.
b
The Income-To-Needs Ratio is calculated by comparing total family income to the relevant family size-adjusted poverty line.
Source: Outgoing rotation group of the March 1990 Current Population Survey.

TABLE 3
SIMULATED DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS FROM AN INCREASE IN THE
MINIMUM WAGE AND THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
Affected Workers’ Householdsa
Wage Increase from $3.35 to $4.25

Total Populationb
Change in EITC Rules from 1989 to 1992

Total Benefit
(billions of
dollars)

Percent of Affected
Households

Marginal Benefit
(billions of dollars)

Less than 1.00

0.658

19.3

0.253

41.3

1.022

25.3

1.00 to 1.25

0.289

8.4

0.088

14.4

0.669

16.6

1.25 to 1.50

0.220

6.4

0.076

12.4

0.637

15.8

1.50 to 2.00

0.419

12.2

0.124

20.2

0.887

22.0

2.00 to 3.00

0.726

21.2

0.062

10.1

0.620

15.3

Greater than 3.00

1.110

32.5

0.010

1.6

0.205

5.0

All Households

$3.422

100.0

$0.613

100.0

$4.040

100.0

Income-to-Needs
Ratioc

Percent of Affected
Households

Marginal Benefit
(billions of dollars)

Percent of Total
Population

a
Affected worker population is defined in exactly the same way as in Table 9.2 of Card and Krueger (1995) as individuals working at the time of the survey
whose wage rate ranged from $3.35 per hour to $4.25 per hour. More detail is provided in the Appendix.
b
Total Population includes all households except those in the military.
c
The Income-to-Needs Ratio is calculated by comparing total family income to the relevant household size-adjusted poverty line
. Source: Outgoing rotation groups of the March 1990 Current Population Survey.

APPENDIX

For both the minimum wage and Earned Income Tax Credit simulations, we used data
from the 1990 March Current Population Survey (CPS). These data are the same as those used
by Card and Krueger (1995). When we replicate their Table 9.2 in our Table 1, we also employ
their sample selection and weighting procedure. In particular, they draw two primary samples for
their analysis which we employ here.
First, in Table 1, the civilian population of all individuals aged 16 and over from the
outgoing rotation group of the March 1990 Current Population Survey is considered in columns
1, 2, 3, and 4a. As family income data and direct information on wage rates are only available for
individuals contained in the outgoing action group of the March supplement, we employ those
data, as do Card and Krueger. Family incomes used to construct the income deciles for these
individuals are retrospective for the prior year. Wages are calculated as the reported wage for
hourly workers last week and usual earnings divided by usual hours last week for all others. The
weight we use when considering individuals is the earnings weight.
Column 4b of Table 1 is the first appearance of the second primary sample used by Card
and Krueger. From the population of all civilians aged 16 or over, additional selection criteria are
used. Wages are calculated as the reported wage for hourly workers and usual earnings divided
by usual hours for others. Those with wages less than $1 or greater than $75 are deleted.
Additionally, individuals are required to be currently employed. Also, people who live in families
that report self-employment income are deleted. Individuals with assigned wages or earnings are
also excluded. Affected workers are then defined as the group of remaining workers who earn at
least $3.35 per hour but less than $4.25. Again, the weights used for this population are the
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earnings weights. We believe that we have essentially replicated the samples and results of Card
and Krueger (1995, Table 9.2) as can be confirmed by a direct comparison.
For Table 2, where we indicate the distribution of workers by wage category and poverty
rate, we employ the same sample selection used by Card and Krueger to define the population of
workers from which affected workers are drawn. This is the second sample described above.
Thus, the portion of workers in the affected group relative to all workers in column 4b of Table 1,
7.1 percent, is equivalent to the portion of workers in the wage interval from $3.35 to $4.25 in
Table 2.
Finally, for Table 3, the focus of the paper shifts to the distribution of family benefits. For
this reason, we employ the family weights in this analysis. The results in the first four columns of
Table 3 depict the projected impact of an instantaneous increase in the minimum wage from $3.35
to $4.25 for those workers affected. In these first four columns, in which it is also important to
track wage rates, we continue to use the outgoing rotation group of the March 1990 Current
Population Survey. In the final two columns we run a similar simulation, described more fully
below, for the EITC, first for affected workers only, then for the United States population. Since
the EITC is based on labor earnings, it is not necessary to know a person's wage rate. Hence, we
are able to use the full March 1990 Current Population Survey. Where totals for programmatic
expenditures are calculated, the weights are adjusted upward to account for deletion from the
relevant segment of the sample due to the selection rules employed.

EITC Simulations

Since the Earned Income Tax Credit is an income tax-based program, we use the
retrospective income data from the entire March 1990 CPS for our simulations. These data are
ideal for studies that focus on families since they contain extensive family data in addition to
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personal data on every individual in the families. In these simulations, we use the EITC structures
that were in place during 1989 and 1992.
In Table 3, we take the population in 1990, using 1989 income information, and simulate
how a change in parameters from the 1989 to 1992 EITC would affect the distribution of benefits
in both the population of all workers and the sample defined by Card and Krueger as those
affected by the minimum wage. In this simulation, we set up a structure for the EITC programs,
as specified by the Internal Revenue Service, that existed in 1989 and 1992. These guidelines
specified two criteria to determine eligibility for the EITC. The first examines family
characteristics to determine eligibility for the program. The second uses income measures to
establish the size of the credit for the eligible families (which will be zero in many cases). While
the unit of analysis for eligibility is the family, the federal income tax filing unit is the measure for
income. In some cases, these will not be the same, since families can file more than one tax
return.

Eligibility

Eligibility depends on the presence of what the IRS defines as a “qualifying child.”
Whether or not an individual in the family is a qualifying child depends on relationship, age, and
residency.
First, a qualifying child must be a direct descendent, either natural, adopted, or through
marriage (e.g., son, grandchild, stepdaughter, etc.) of someone in the family. A foster child may
qualify if he or she lived with the family for the entire year.
Second, the child must be under age 19 at the end of the tax year. This age restriction is
increased to 24 if the child is a full-time student, and it is eliminated altogether if the child is
totally or permanently disabled.
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Third, the child must live in the main home of the family for more than six months of the
year. Any child who is born into the family or who dies during the tax year is exempt from this
test.
In our simulations only the relationship and age tests are applied to determine if a
qualifying child resided in the family. We ignore the residency test because in cases where the
residency test is not met in the data, it follows that the parent or person who does match with the
qualifying child is out of the data set. In order not to lose the observation completely, we use the
current family data available in the CPS for that child as a proxy for the missing data.
With the data available in the CPS, both the relationship and age tests can be applied in a
straightforward manner. The only exception is the disabled child, who has no age restriction. The
CPS survey only asks respondents whether or not they were unable to work at any time during
the previous year because of health problems, and does not ask about disabilities directly.
Therefore, we do not attempt to identify permanently disabled children.
Once the age and relationship tests are met by a child in the family, the family is
considered to be eligible for the program in the simulation. The next step is to apply the income
test to the appropriate tax-filing unit.
Only one tax-filing unit within a family may claim the earned income tax credit. That is,
only one credit is available per family. However, as will be discussed below, the age and number
of qualifying children can affect the size of the credit under the 1992 rules. Under the 1989 rules,
however, the credit was the same size for families with one child and families with more than one
child.
All domestic tax filers who meet the income and child criteria are eligible for the credit,
except married couples who file separately. In our simulations, we assume that all eligible married
couples filed jointly.
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Multiple-generation families who co-reside will generally have more than one tax-filing
unit who can claim the qualifying child. In these situations the IRS has two rules to determine
who gets the credit. The first is that tax filers who are qualifying children cannot themselves be
eligible for the earned income credit. For example, an 18-year-old mother with a qualifying child
of her own, who lives with her parents, is ineligible to receive the earned income credit since she
is a qualifying child herself. In this case, the parents will receive the earned income credit based
on the 18 year old mother being the qualifying child in the family.
The second rule applies when more than one tax-filing unit can claim the qualifying child.
In this case the tax-filing unit with the higher adjusted gross income will be the one to claim the
earned income credit. In the above example, if the mother were age 20 instead of age 18, she
would no longer be a qualifying child herself as she fails to pass the age test. Her child now
becomes the qualifying child, and both she and her parents are eligible to claim the earned income
credit. The tax-filing unit with the higher adjusted gross income will receive the credit. If either
tax-filing unit’s adjusted gross income falls outside the range of the earned income credit, then no
credit will be paid out.
The second rule was used for all cases of multi-generational families in the 1992
simulations (1989 rules differ and will be discussed below). The first rule is much more rarely
invoked than the second in the data and, given that multi-generational families only comprise
around 5 percent of those in the CPS, we feel little would be gained by attempting to incorporate
the first rule.
As noted, the above discussion on the two tie-breaking rules for multi-generational
families applies only to 1992. Prior to 1991, the IRS placed more restrictions on the filing status
of single persons with a qualifying child. Specifically, the person had to file as head of household
or as a qualifying widow or widower. Therefore, in the 1989 simulations, if more than two tax27

filing units could claim the qualifying child we always use the head of the family (and spouse, if
present) as the appropriate tax-filing unit and do not use the higher adjusted gross income tiebreaker rule. In the examples described above, the young mother would not be able to file as the
single head of household regardless of her age, as long as she resides with her parents.

Income Criteria

Once the appropriate tax filling unit is determined, the income criteria are applied. In
general, even though the CPS has quite detailed income data, any attempt to simulate the effect of
actual IRS rules on income would be much less precise than what can be attempted with respect
to the family characteristic rules. Any attempt to simulate the completion of a tax return would be
crude, since in actual practice it requires much more information. However, low-income families
generally have few (and uncomplicated) income sources.
The two income measures used to calculate the actual EITC credit are (1) earned income
and (2) adjusted gross income. Earned income as defined by the IRS includes the following:
wages, salaries, tips, net earnings from self-employment, union strike benefits, certain long-term
disability benefits, voluntary salary deferrals, combat pay, basic quarters and subsistence
allowances from the United States military, meals or lodging provided by an employer, housing
allowance for the clergy, excludable employer-provided dependent care benefits, and anything else
of value (money, goods, or services) provided for services rendered. In our simulations we
included only wages, salaries, tips, net earnings from self-employment, and union strike benefits.
All of the other forms of earned income are unavailable in the CPS. As a result, our simulated
measure of adjusted gross income at times underestimates the true value (how this affects our
results is discussed below). However, we feel that our estimates of wage income are reasonable.
Most of the missing information applies disproportionately to high-income individuals who would
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not be eligible for the program. Thus, the absence of this information should have only a small
effect on our earned income estimate. Also, as a result of a lack of detailed information on
military housing benefits, we use only the civilian population. Adjusted gross income starts with
earned income as the base, then adds other sources of income and subtracts various credits. We
add the following sources of income into our simulated measure of adjusted gross income:
interest income, dividends, alimony, rental income, royalties, and unemployment compensation.
We do not include taxable refunds of state and local income taxes, capital gains or losses, or IRA
distributions because this information is unavailable in the CPS. Additionally, adjusted gross
income includes certain pension benefits and, in some instances, Social Security benefits. We do
not include either of these two sources as the CPS does not have the information to determine
what percentage, if any, of these benefits are taxable. Pension benefits depend upon the
recipient’s contribution history. The taxpayer receives a Form W-2P in these instances to help
calculate the taxable amount. Social Security benefits also require a form (SSA-1099) to find the
taxable amount.
We only include one credit adjustment in our measure of adjusted gross income, the onehalf of the self-employment tax that can be subtracted. Other credits not available are IRA
contributions, Keough retirement plan contributions, and alimony paid. Given that adjusted gross
income includes both additions and subtractions, we may at times either underestimate or
overestimate its true value. However, in most cases of missing information, it is likely that
underestimation is the result, because individuals will have additions from other income sources
greater than any credits that they could subtract.
For married couples, the earned income and adjusted gross incomes of the head and
spouse are added together to get the earned income and the adjusted gross income measures that

29

apply to the appropriate tax-filing unit. In the case of a single parent who receives the EITC, the
individual’s earned income and adjusted gross income are the appropriate measures.
For families whose earned income and adjusted gross income both fall within the range of
the EITC, the next step is to determine which of the two measures should be used to calculate
the size of the credit. Table 1A lists the EITC parameters for calender years 1989 and 1992. The
maximum cutoffs are $19,430 in 1989 and $22,370 in 1992 for all families. Therefore, all families
with earned and adjusted gross incomes below these amounts and above $0 of earned income are
eligible to receive the credit. As long as adjusted gross income does not exceed the beginning
income of the phase-out range, the earned income measure is appropriate. For adjusted gross
income above this level, the appropriate measure of income is the higher of adjusted gross income
or earned income.
The phase-in and phase-out rates vary depending upon family composition for 1992, but
not for 1989. In 1989, a family with one qualifying child of any age would be subject to the same
phase-in and phase-out rates as a family with several qualifying children. In 1992, however, these
rates vary by the number of children present. In addition, in 1992 there is a special child credit
given to any eligible family with a child under one year of age.
In 1992, one additional credit, the supplemental health credit, was available for individuals
who paid, out of their own pocket, for any health premiums that included coverage for the
qualifying child(ren). The CPS did not contain the information necessary to do this calculation.
Since this program is a small and tangential part of the overall earned income tax credit program,
we feel that our estimates are not be severely affected by this omission.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1A
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT PARAMETERS IN 1989 AND 1992

Phase-Out Range
Credit Rate
(Percent)

Minimum Income for
Maximum Credit
(dollars)

Maximum
Credit
(dollars)

14

$6,500

$ 910

One Child

17.6

7,520

Two Children

18.4
5.0

Calendar Year
1989

Phase-Out
Rate
(percent)

Beginning
Income

Ending
Income

10.00

$10,240

$19,430

1,324

12.57

11,840

22,370

7,520

1,384

13.14

11,840

22,370

7.520

376

3.57

11,840

22,370

1992

Additional Infant Child Credit

Source: United States House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means The 1994 Green Book (1994).

ENDNOTES
1.

The target efficiency of a negative income tax has long been recognized by economists.
Christopher Green (1967) believes the two main proponents of this form of distribution to
the poor in the 1960s were Milton Friedman (1962) and Robert J. Lampman (1965) but
that its origins go back to the 1940s. According to Green, “correspondence with
Friedman, Walter Heller, William Vickrey, and Louis Shere turned up the fact that there
had been some discussion of [a negative income tax] during the 1940s, and that the subject
had been informally discussed by some researchers, including Heller and Vickrey, then at
the Division of Tax Research, Treasury Department. There is no evidence, however, that
a paper on the subject was prepared in the Division of Tax Research” (Green 1967, 57, n.
21). He then cites the Stigler (1946) article as evidence that the idea was in the air in the
1940s. Stigler, in personal correspondence with Burkhauser, reported that “for some
reason that I cannot recall but have long regretted, I omitted from my passing
endorsements of the negative income tax the appropriate footnote, <I’m indebted to
Milton Friedman for this suggestion.’”

2.

For an excellent source on the role of Ely, Commons, and other members of the
“Wisconsin School” on social issues of the day, see Lampman (1993).

3.

This case is significant for two reasons. First, it expanded the power of legislatures to
intervene in labor markets, although only for women, based on the view that “even though
all restrictions on political, personal, and contractual rights were taken away, and she
[women] stood, so far as statutes are concerned, upon an absolutely equal plane with him
[men], it would still be true that she is so constituted that she will rest upon and look to
him for protection; that her physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal
functions—having in view not merely her own health, but the well-being of the
race—justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the passion of man”
(Muller v. State of Oregon, p. 327).
Second, for the first time social science evidence was permitted to be introduced before
the United States Supreme Court. The social science evidence is summarized in a
footnote as “over ninety reports of committees, bureaus of statistics, commissioners of
hygiene, inspectors of factories, both in this country and in Europe, to the effect that long
hours of labor are dangerous for women, primarily because of their special physical
organization” (Muller v. State of Oregon, p. 324). This evidence was introduced by
Louis Brandeis, then attorney for the State of Oregon, who was appointed to the Supreme
Court in 1916.

4.

As evidence that the public at large considered the last increase in the minimum wage to
be a socially just exercise of government regulatory power, the Catholic bishops’ pastoral
letter (National Conference of Catholic Bishops 1986) strongly endorsed an increase in the
minimum wage in 1986. Even a poll of corporate executives, at that time, whose taste for
spiritual rewards may be a bit more limited, voiced some support for increasing the
minimum wage. “More than a third...felt it was a corporate responsibility to meet the
minimum poverty requirements as determined by the government” (Magnus 1987). In his
testimony before the Joint Economic Committee in 1995, Gary Burtless cites opinion polls
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that register overwhelming popular support for increasing the minimum wage (Burtless
1995).
5.

More formally their measure assumes that there are perfect economics of scale in houshold
production, that is, that no additional income is necessary to maintain the same level of
individual economic well-being when family size increases by one. See Burkhauser,
Smeeding, and Merz (1994) for a recent discussion of the importance of choice of
equivalence scale on measure of inequality.

6.

The income brackets for the decile are: less than $8,000; $8,000 to $13,560; $13,560 to
$19,132; $19,132 to $25,000; $25,000 to $31,175; $31,175 to $38,240; $38,240 to
$46,900; $46,900 to $57,292; $57,292 to $76,800; $76,800 and greater.

7.

See Citro and Michael (1995) for a fuller discussion of this issue.

8.

We would also note that a major theme of the work of Horrigan and Mincy (1993) was
the target efficiency of the minimum wage relative to the Earned Income Tax Credit. This
again shows other scholars view Stigler’s second question concerning alternative policies
as important in this context.

9.

These numerical examples are, of course, only for workers still in the credit range of the
EITC. Past that range, effective hourly wages would fall. The example is meant only to
translate the concept of an EITC into minimum wage terms. The point is that the EITC
effectively answers Stigler’s criticism of the minimum wage in that it more closely links
wages to need.

10.

Card and Krueger come closest to the historical debate in the final section of Chapter 9
when they use natural experiment techniques to show that the effect of minimum wage
hikes on the overall poverty rates of adults is statistically undetectable.

11.

The fact that two-thirds of adults live in poverty is not the critical point, since most of
these adults live in families in which at least one adult does work. The more relevant
number is that 25.7 percent of poor families have no working adults. (See Burkhauser,
Couch, and Glenn 1995, Table 3.) This is indeed a problem for both minimum wage and
EITC policy, although the dollar for dollar impact of moving non-working adults into the
workplace is likely to be larger for the EITC. (For a fuller discussion of the relative
behavior effects of minimum wage and EITC policy, see Burkhauser, Couch, and Glenn
1995.).
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